By clicking join, you authorize us to communicate with you in accordance with our Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy.       Email elimelech@jewish-survival.com with your comments.

Proportionality

Please Note: Information provided by AI sources such as ChatGPT or Claude may be false. Readers must verify all facts before including them in the answers to the four questions. If you become aware of incorrect information in this document please let Jewish-Survival know.
How does the IDF implement the requirement for proportionality? Is it limited to collateral damage? What about bombing a building with 10 babies inside? How is this justified. Does proportionality only apply to collateral damage? If the enemy kills 2 soldiers can Israel respond and kill 100 soldiers?  Your questions relate to the law of armed conflict (LOAC)—especially the rule of proportionality. I’ll explain how proportionality works legally, how the IDF says it applies it, and clarify several common misunderstandings.   
  1. What “Proportionality” Means in the Law of War
Proportionality is a rule from international humanitarian law (IHL) found in: 
  • the Geneva Conventions 
  • Additional Protocol I (1977) 
  • customary international law 
The rule states that an attack is prohibited if:  the expected civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.  Important points: 
  • It does not compare casualties on each side. 
  • It compares civilian harm vs military advantage. 
So proportionality is not a numerical balance of deaths.   
  1. Proportionality Is About Civilian Harm (Collateral Damage)
Yes — the proportionality rule mainly concerns incidental civilian harm.  It applies when: 
  • legitimate military target is attacked 
  • but civilians or civilian property may also be harmed. 
The attacker must assess whether the expected civilian damage would be excessive relative to the military benefit.  This is what is often called collateral damage.   
  1. If a Target Is Purely Military
If a target is purely military, proportionality usually does not limit the number of enemy combatants killed.  For example: 
  • destroying an enemy battalion 
  • bombing a military base 
  • sinking a warship 
All enemy soldiers in the target may be lawfully killed.  There is no requirement that deaths be “equal” to what the enemy caused.   
  1. Example: “2 soldiers vs 100 soldiers”
In the law of war, retaliation is not measured by casualty numbers.  If a legitimate military target contains 100 enemy soldiers, it can be attacked even if the enemy previously killed only 2 soldiers.  The legal question is: 
  • Is the target military? 
  • Is the attack necessary and lawful? 
The number of enemy casualties does not determine proportionality.   
  1. What About Bombing a BuildingWithBabies Inside? 
This is where proportionality analysis becomes critical.  A building can be a lawful military target if it is used for military purposes, such as: 
  • weapons storage 
  • command center 
  • rocket launch site 
  • militant headquarters 
But if civilians are present, commanders must assess: 
  • expected civilian casualties 
  • the military advantage of destroying the target 
  • whether other options exist 
If the expected civilian harm would be excessive compared to the military advantage, the attack must not be carried out.   
  1. How the IDF Says It Implements Proportionality
The IDF states that it applies several mechanisms: 
  1. Legal advisors in operational planning
Military lawyers review many planned strikes. 
  1. Intelligence assessments
Estimating: 
  • number of civilians likely present 
  • military importance of the target. 
  1. Target verification
Confirming the target is genuinely military. 
  1. Warning civilians whenfeasible
Examples include: 
  • phone calls 
  • text messages 
  • leaflet drops 
  • “roof knocking” warning munitions. 
These steps are intended to reduce civilian harm.   
  1. The Proportionality Judgment Is Predictive
A key point often misunderstood:  The proportionality assessment is based on what commanders reasonably expect before the attack, not the outcome afterward.  If civilians unexpectedly enter an area after the decision is made, the legality may still depend on the information available at the time.   
  1. Why Proportionality Is Controversial
The rule is controversial because: 
  • “excessive” is not mathematically defined 
  • commanders must make judgment calls 
  • different observers may evaluate the same strike differently. 
This leads to frequent legal and political disputes about particular attacks.   
  1. Important Additional Rules
Proportionality is only one rule in the law of armed conflict.  Other key rules include:  Distinction  Attacks must target combatants or military objectives, not civilians.  Precautions in attack  Commanders must take feasible steps to minimize civilian harm.  Military necessity  The attack must serve a legitimate military purpose.    Summary 
  • Proportionality does not compare casualties on each side. 
  • It compares expected civilian harm to military advantage. 
  • It mainly applies to collateral damage, not enemy combatant casualties. 
  • A building used for military purposes may be attacked even if civilians are present, but the attack must not cause excessive civilian harm relative to the military benefit. 
  • Killing large numbers of enemy soldiers is lawful if they are legitimate military targets. 
  If you want, I can also explain something that many people find surprising:  Why the proportionality rule in international law is much less precise than most people assume, and how different armies interpret it differently.  yes  Yes — many people are surprised to learn that the proportionality rule in the law of armed conflict is intentionally not precise. It is written as a judgment standard, not a mathematical formula. Because of this, different militaries and legal scholars sometimes interpret it differently.  Below is how this works in practice.   
  1. Why Proportionality Is Not Defined Numerically
International humanitarian law deliberately avoids setting numerical thresholds such as: 
  • a fixed ratio of civilian casualties to military gain 
  • a maximum number of civilian deaths 
  • a specific damage limit. 
The rule simply says an attack is unlawful if civilian harm would be:  “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”  This language appears in Additional Protocol I (1977), Article 51(5)(b) and is widely accepted as customary international law.  The drafters avoided numbers because: 
  • battlefields are unpredictable 
  • military advantages differ greatly between targets 
  • rigid formulas could make lawful operations impossible. 
 
  1. What Commanders Actually Evaluate
Before an attack, military planners typically consider several factors: 
  1. Military value of the target
Examples: 
  • senior commander 
  • weapons stockpile 
  • missile launcher 
  • communications center. 
The more important the target, the greater the military advantage.   
  1. Expected civilian presence
Commanders try to estimate: 
  • how many civilians are nearby 
  • whether they can evacuate 
  • whether civilians are being used as shields. 
 
  1. Type of weapon used
Different weapons cause different levels of destruction.  For example: 
  • precision-guided missile 
  • artillery shell 
  • large air-dropped bomb. 
 
  1. Timing of the attack
An attack might be delayed to: 
  • reduce civilian presence 
  • wait for nighttime 
  • wait for evacuation. 
 
  1. The Decision Is Made Before the Strike
The legality of a strike is judged based on:  what a reasonable commander could anticipate at the time of the decision.  This is called the “reasonable commander standard.”  If civilians unexpectedly enter the area afterward, the strike may still be lawful if the original assessment was reasonable.   
  1. Why Different Armies Reach Different Conclusions
Because proportionality is a judgment standard, militaries may differ in: 
  • intelligence quality 
  • tolerance for risk to their own forces 
  • interpretation of military advantage. 
For example, destroying: 
  • a major command center 
  • a weapons factory 
  • a senior operational leader 
might justify higher collateral damage risk than destroying a small tactical position.   
  1. Human Shields Complicate the Analysis
International law recognizes that some armed groups place military assets in civilian areas.  In those cases: 
  • the target may still be lawful 
  • but proportionality still applies. 
However, the presence of human shields does not automatically make an attack illegal.  It is one of the factors considered in the proportionality calculation.   
  1. Why This Rule Is Often Misunderstood
Many people assume proportionality means: 
  • equal casualties on both sides 
  • retaliation limits 
  • a numerical ratio. 
None of these appear in the law of armed conflict.  The rule instead focuses on civilian protection relative to military necessity.   
  1. Why Critics Say the Rule Is Too Vague
Some critics argue that proportionality is difficult to enforce because: 
  • “excessive” is subjective 
  • military advantage can be interpreted broadly 
  • real-time decisions are complex. 
Supporters argue that the rule must remain flexible because war cannot be governed by rigid formulas.   
  1. How Courts Evaluate Proportionality
When courts review military actions, they generally ask: 
  • Was the target a legitimate military objective? 
  • What did commanders reasonably expect before the attack? 
  • Were feasible precautions taken? 
  • Was the expected civilian harm excessive relative to the anticipated military gain? 
Courts rarely try to second-guess battlefield judgments with exact casualty comparisons.    Summary 
  • Proportionality in international law does not use numerical formulas. 
  • It balances expected civilian harm against military advantage. 
  • The assessment is made before the attack, based on available intelligence. 
  • Because the rule requires judgment, different militaries may interpret it differently. 
  If you want, I can also explain something that is directly related to your earlier questions about Israeli law:  How the Israeli Supreme Court has interpreted proportionality and military necessity in some of its most important war-related rulings.  yes  The Israeli Supreme Court (sitting as the High Court of Justice – Bagatz) has addressed proportionality and military necessity in several landmark rulings. These decisions are frequently cited in international law because they try to apply the law of armed conflict while Israel is still in active conflict.  Below are the most important cases and how the Court interpreted proportionality.   
  1. Beit Sourik Case (2004) – The Security Barrier
HCJ 2056/04 – Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel  Issue  Palestinian villages challenged the route of Israel’s West Bank security barrier, arguing it caused excessive harm to civilians.  Court ruling  The Court ruled: 
  • Israel has the right to build the barrier for security reasons. 
  • But parts of the route caused disproportionate harm to Palestinian civilians. 
The Court ordered sections of the barrier to be rerouted.  Key principle  Chief Justice Aharon Barak articulated a three-part proportionality test: 
  1. Rational connection The measure must help achieve the military/security objective. 
  1. Least harmful means If several options exist, the one causing less civilian harm should be chosen. 
  1. Proportional balance The harm caused must not be disproportionate to the security benefit. 
This framework became central to Israeli constitutional law.   
  1. Targeted Killing Case (2006)
HCJ 769/02 – Public Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel  Issue  Whether the IDF could legally carry out targeted killings of terrorist operatives.  Court ruling  The Court ruled targeted killings are not automatically illegal, but each operation must satisfy several conditions.  Key requirements included: 
  • the target must be directly participating in hostilities 
  • capture should be considered if feasible 
  • proportionality must be respected 
  • civilian harm must be minimized 
  • post-operation investigations should occur when civilians are harmed. 
Importance  The Court accepted that Israel is engaged in armed conflict with terrorist organizations, but insisted on applying proportionality and precaution principles.   
  1. Human Shield Case (2005)
HCJ 3799/02 – Adalah v. IDF Central Command  Issue  Whether the IDF could ask Palestinian civilians to assist in certain military operations (for example, approaching buildings before soldiers entered).  Court ruling  The Court ruled this practice illegal.  It held that: 
  • civilians cannot be used to reduce risks to soldiers 
  • doing so violates the protection owed to civilians. 
This ruling reinforced the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants.   
  1. Gaza Border Rules of Engagement Case (2018)
HCJ 3003/18 – Yesh Din v. Chief of Staff  Issue  NGOs argued that the IDF’s use of live fire against Gaza border infiltrators violated international law.  Court ruling  The Court rejected the petition.  It held that: 
  • the events were part of an armed conflict with Hamas 
  • the IDF rules of engagement were consistent with international law 
  • live fire could be used as a last resort to stop infiltration or danger. 
The Court accepted the military’s proportionality assessments.   
  1. Assigned Residence Case (2002)
HCJ 7015/02 – Ajuri v. IDF Commander  Issue  Whether relatives of suspected militants could be relocated from the West Bank to Gaza for security reasons.  Court ruling  The Court allowed the policy only if it met proportionality requirements.  The military had to show: 
  • a genuine security need 
  • a connection between the person and the threat 
  • that the measure was not excessive. 
 
  1. Physicians for Human Rights Case (2004)
HCJ 4764/04 – Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF  Issue  Humanitarian access during military operations in Palestinian cities.  Court ruling  The Court ruled the IDF must: 
  • allow medical evacuation where possible 
  • facilitate humanitarian assistance when feasible. 
The decision balanced military necessity with humanitarian obligations.   
  1. How the Court Applies Proportionality
Across these cases, the Court uses a structured test similar to constitutional law analysis.  It asks: 
  1. Is the objective legitimate and related to security? 
  1. Does the measure help achieve that objective? 
  1. Is there a less harmful alternative? 
  1. Is the harm excessive relative to the benefit? 
This approach blends international humanitarian law and Israeli constitutional law.   
  1. Why These Rulings Are Unusual Internationally
Few courts in other countries review military decisions during active conflicts.  Israel’s Supreme Court does this because: 
  • citizens and NGOs can petition it directly 
  • it functions both as a constitutional court and a high administrative court. 
As a result, its rulings are frequently studied in: 
  • international law 
  • military law 
  • counter-terrorism policy. 
  Summary  The Israeli Supreme Court has addressed proportionality in several major cases, including: 
  • Beit Sourik (2004) – security barrier route 
  • Targeted Killings (2006) – rules for lethal counter-terrorism strikes 
  • Human Shield Case (2005) – prohibition on using civilians in operations 
  • Gaza Border Case (2018) – legality of IDF live fire rules 
  • Ajuri (2002) – proportionality in security measures. 
In these rulings, the Court consistently applies a balancing test between military necessity and civilian protection.    If you want, I can also explain something that is extremely relevant to your earlier questions:  Why many military lawyers argue that urban warfare against groups like Hamas pushes the proportionality rule to its limits.  yes  Urban warfare against armed groups such as Hamas, ISIS, or similar organizations creates some of the most difficult situations for the proportionality rule in international humanitarian law (IHL). Military lawyers often say that modern urban conflict pushes this rule to its limits, because several factors make civilian protection much harder.  I’ll explain the main reasons.   
  1. Armed Groups Operating Inside Civilian Areas
Groups like Hamas often place military assets in densely populated areas, including: 
  • residential buildings 
  • schools 
  • mosques 
  • hospitals 
  • underground tunnels beneath civilian neighborhoods. 
When a military target is located inside a civilian area, an attack may still be lawful if the target is genuinely military. However, the attacker must still evaluate expected civilian harm versus military advantage.  This creates extremely difficult proportionality assessments.   
  1. Use of Human Shields
International law prohibits using civilians to shield military targets.  However, when armed groups operate within civilian populations, it becomes difficult to distinguish between: 
  • voluntary civilian presence 
  • forced human shielding 
  • ordinary residential living areas where militants operate. 
The presence of civilians does not automatically make the target immune, but it complicates proportionality calculations.   
  1. Dense Population and Infrastructure
Cities contain: 
  • apartment buildings 
  • electrical networks 
  • hospitals 
  • water systems 
  • roads and tunnels. 
Attacking one military target may damage surrounding civilian infrastructure. Commanders must therefore assess: 
  • blast radius 
  • secondary explosions 
  • risk to nearby buildings. 
In dense cities, even precision weapons can cause unexpected collateral damage.   
  1. Underground Warfare
In conflicts such as those involving Hamas, military infrastructure often exists underground, including: 
  • tunnels 
  • command centers 
  • weapons storage. 
Destroying underground facilities may require large explosives, which increase the risk of damage to buildings above ground.  This complicates proportionality calculations because the military target may be hidden beneath civilian structures.   
  1. Real-Time Intelligence Limits
Proportionality assessments rely on intelligence about civilian presence.  But in urban combat: 
  • civilians may move unpredictably 
  • militants may hide among civilians 
  • intelligence may be incomplete. 
Commanders must therefore make decisions under uncertainty.  International law evaluates these decisions based on what a reasonable commander could have expected at the time, not perfect hindsight.   
  1. Risk to Soldiers vs Risk to Civilians
Another difficult issue is the balance between: 
  • protecting one’s own soldiers 
  • minimizing civilian harm. 
For example: 
  • sending troops into a building may reduce civilian casualties but increase risk to soldiers 
  • airstrikes may protect soldiers but increase risk to civilians. 
International law does not require a military to maximize danger to its own soldiers, but it requires feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm.   
  1. Time Pressure
Urban combat decisions are often made very quickly.  Commanders may have minutes to decide whether to strike a target before it disappears or launches an attack.  This limits the ability to gather perfect intelligence or evacuate civilians.   
  1. Why Legal Disputes Arise
Because proportionality involves judgment rather than a precise formula, observers may disagree about whether a particular strike was lawful.  Different assessments may arise from: 
  • different intelligence information 
  • different views of the military value of the target 
  • different estimates of expected civilian harm. 
This is why urban warfare often generates intense legal and political debates.    Summary  Urban warfare pushes the proportionality rule to its limits because: 
  • military targets are embedded in civilian areas 
  • armed groups may use human shields 
  • dense infrastructure increases collateral damage risks 
  • intelligence is often incomplete 
  • commanders must make rapid decisions under uncertainty. 
For these reasons, proportionality assessments in urban conflicts are among the most complex legal judgments in modern warfare.    If you want, I can also explain something closely related that many people misunderstand:  Why international humanitarian law allows attacks on buildings that are normally civilian objects if they are used for military purposes.  yes  Yes — this is a very important principle in international humanitarian law (IHL) and it is often misunderstood.  A building that is normally civilian (such as a house, school, mosque, or hospital) can lose its protected status if it is used for military purposes. When that happens, it can become a lawful military target, subject to the rules of distinction, necessity, proportionality, and precautions.  Let’s break down how this works.   
  1. The Principle of Distinction
One of the core rules of the law of armed conflict is distinction.  Combatants must distinguish between: 
  • military objectives (which may be attacked) 
  • civilian objects (which may not be attacked). 
However, the definition of a military objective includes objects that:  by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a definite military advantage.  This definition comes from Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Article 52) and is widely accepted as customary international law.   
  1. How a Civilian Building Can Become a Military Target
A building can become a lawful target if it is used for activities such as: 
  • storing weapons or ammunition 
  • launching rockets or mortars 
  • housing command centers 
  • sheltering combatants during operations 
  • serving as observation posts 
  • providing entrances to military tunnels. 
When a building is used in these ways, it is considered to be making an effective contribution to military action.   
  1. Special Protection for Certain Facilities
Some facilities have special protection, including: 
  • hospitals 
  • medical units 
  • religious buildings 
  • cultural sites. 
However, even these can lose protection if they are used for military purposes, such as: 
  • storing weapons in a hospital 
  • firing from a mosque 
  • operating command centers in protected buildings. 
In such cases, international law typically requires a warning if feasible, giving the misuse a chance to stop.   
  1. Proportionality Still Applies
Even if a building becomes a military target, the attack must still satisfy the proportionality rule.  That means the expected civilian harm cannot be excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage.  So if a building contains: 
  • civilians 
  • residents 
  • bystanders 
those risks must be considered before the strike.   
  1. Precautions in Attack
Military forces are required to take feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm.  These may include: 
  • choosing precision weapons 
  • attacking at times when fewer civilians are present 
  • issuing warnings if possible 
  • selecting a different method of attack. 
These precautions are required under international humanitarian law.   
  1. Why This Issue Is Controversial
In modern conflicts, especially in dense urban areas, armed groups sometimes place military assets inside civilian infrastructure.  This creates difficult situations because: 
  • civilians may still live in or near those buildings 
  • destroying the military asset may cause civilian casualties. 
Legal disputes often arise over whether: 
  • the building was genuinely used for military purposes 
  • the expected civilian harm was excessive. 
 
  1. Loss of Protection Is Temporary
An important point is that the loss of civilian protection lasts only as long as the building is used for military purposes.  If the military use stops, the building regains civilian protection.    Summary  A civilian building can become a lawful military target if it is used for military purposes. However: 
  • the attacker must verify the military use 
  • proportionality must be respected 
  • feasible precautions must be taken to reduce civilian harm. 
These rules are part of the broader framework of international humanitarian law governing armed conflict.    If you’d like, I can also explain a closely related issue that often comes up in discussions of Gaza and similar conflicts:  How international law treats underground military tunnels located beneath civilian buildings.  yes  Underground military tunnels beneath civilian buildings raise complex issues in international humanitarian law (IHL). The law treats them under the same core principles: distinction, military objective, proportionality, and precautions in attack. The complication is that the military target is underground while civilians may be above ground.  Below is how the law generally approaches this situation.   
  1. Tunnels Can Be Military Objectives
A tunnel is considered a military objective if it contributes to military operations.  Examples include tunnels used for: 
  • moving fighters 
  • storing weapons 
  • command and control centers 
  • launching attacks 
  • infiltrating across borders. 
If a tunnel serves these functions, it can be lawfully targeted.  This applies even if the tunnel runs under civilian buildings.   
  1. The Building Above May Become Part of the Military Objective
If the tunnel entrance or operational infrastructure is located inside a building, that building may lose its civilian protection.  For example: 
  • a house used as a tunnel entrance 
  • a building used to access an underground command center 
  • a structure used to store weapons connected to the tunnel system. 
In such cases, the building may become part of the military objective.   
  1. Proportionality Still Applies
Even when a tunnel is a legitimate target, commanders must evaluate expected civilian harm.  For example, destroying an underground facility may: 
  • collapse buildings above 
  • cause fires or explosions 
  • injure civilians nearby. 
The proportionality rule requires that expected civilian harm not be excessive compared to the military advantage.   
  1. Precautions in Attack
International law requires feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm.  Possible measures include: 
  • using smaller or precision-guided munitions 
  • striking at times when civilians are less likely to be present 
  • issuing warnings if possible 
  • targeting tunnel entrances rather than large sections of urban areas. 
What is considered “feasible” depends on the circumstances and military situation.   
  1. Why Tunnels Create Legal Challenges
Underground warfare complicates proportionality because: 
  • the full tunnel network may not be visible 
  • destroying tunnels may require large explosives 
  • tunnels may run directly under residential areas. 
This makes it difficult to predict the exact damage to buildings above.   
  1. Human Shields and Civilian Presence
When military infrastructure is deliberately placed beneath civilian areas, it raises questions about human shielding.  International law prohibits: 
  • using civilians to shield military objectives from attack. 
However, even when human shields are present, the attacker must still conduct a proportionality assessment.  The presence of civilians does not automatically make the target immune from attack.   
  1. Legal Disputes Often Focus on Evidence
Disagreements about strikes involving tunnels often center on: 
  • whether the tunnel actually existed 
  • whether the building above was used for military purposes 
  • whether the expected civilian harm was excessive. 
These issues can be difficult to verify during active conflicts.    Summary  Under international humanitarian law: 
  • tunnels used for military purposes are lawful military targets 
  • buildings used to access or support those tunnels may lose civilian protection 
  • attacks must still satisfy proportionality and precaution requirements. 
Because tunnels are often located beneath densely populated areas, they create some of the most complex legal and operational challenges in modern urban warfare.    If you want, I can also explain something closely connected to this topic that many people find surprising:  Why the law of armed conflict allows destruction of entire buildings even if the military target inside is relatively small.  yes  Yes, this issue often surprises people. Under the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law – IHL), it is sometimes lawful to destroy an entire building even if the specific military target inside it is relatively small. The legality depends on whether the building itself becomes a military objective and whether the attack satisfies proportionality and precaution requirements.  Here is how the law approaches this.   
  1. A Building Can Become a Military Objective
A building becomes a lawful military target if it makes an effective contribution to military action.  Examples include buildings used for: 
  • command centers 
  • weapons storage 
  • sniper positions 
  • rocket launch sites 
  • entrances to tunnels 
  • communications infrastructure. 
Once a building is used for military purposes, it can lose its civilian protection.  In that situation, destroying the building may be considered a way to neutralize the military objective.   
  1. The Size of the Target Does Not Automatically Limit the Strike
International law does not require that the physical size of the target match the size of the weapon or damage.  The key legal questions are: 
  1. Is the object a military objective? 
  1. Does destroying it provide a concrete military advantage? 
  1. Would the expected civilian harm be excessive compared to that advantage? 
If the building itself is used for military operations, destroying the whole structure may be considered the most effective way to eliminate the threat.   
  1. Structural Reality of Buildings
In many cases, the military asset cannot be removed without destroying the structure.  For example: 
  • weapons stored inside walls or basements 
  • command centers occupying entire floors 
  • tunnel shafts embedded in foundations. 
Destroying the building may be the only way to disable the military use.   
  1. Proportionality Still Limits the Attack
Even if the building is a military objective, the proportionality rule still applies.  Commanders must consider: 
  • how many civilians are likely inside 
  • nearby residential buildings 
  • blast effects and secondary explosions. 
If the expected civilian harm would be excessive compared to the military advantage, the attack must not occur.   
  1. Precautions to Reduce Civilian Harm
International humanitarian law requires feasible precautions to reduce civilian casualties.  Examples may include: 
  • selecting smaller precision weapons 
  • issuing evacuation warnings 
  • delaying the strike until civilians leave 
  • attacking at a different time. 
These steps are intended to reduce harm to civilians while still allowing the military objective to be neutralized.   
  1. Why Entire Buildings Are Sometimes Targeted
Modern conflicts often involve non-state armed groups operating inside urban areas.  This creates situations where: 
  • military activity occurs inside residential structures 
  • weapons and fighters are embedded within civilian environments. 
As a result, the building itself can become part of the military objective.   
  1. Why These Situations Are Controversial
Legal debates often arise because outside observers may question: 
  • whether the building was truly used for military purposes 
  • whether the expected civilian harm was excessive 
  • whether sufficient precautions were taken. 
Because these assessments depend heavily on military intelligence and operational information, disagreements frequently occur.    Summary  Under international humanitarian law: 
  • a civilian building can become a military objective if it is used for military purposes 
  • destroying the entire building may be lawful if that is necessary to neutralize the military objective 
  • proportionality and precaution rules still apply to limit civilian harm. 
These principles are part of the broader framework governing combat operations in urban warfare.    If you want, I can also explain a related question that many people struggle with when thinking about proportionality:  Why the law of armed conflict does not require militaries to sacrifice their own soldiers in order to reduce enemy civilian casualties.  yes  This is one of the most debated issues in the law of armed conflict (LOAC): whether a military must risk its own soldiers’ lives in order to reduce enemy civilian casualties. The short answer under international humanitarian law is:  No — the law does not require a military to sacrifice its own soldiers to protect enemy civilians.  However, the law does require feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm. The balance between those two principles is where the debate lies.   
  1. What the Law Actually Requires
International humanitarian law requires commanders to take “feasible precautions” to minimize civilian harm.  The key term is feasible.  In legal language, “feasible” means:  precautions that are practicable or practically possible, taking into account military and humanitarian considerations.  This comes from the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Article 57) and customary international law.  This means commanders must try to reduce civilian harm when it can reasonably be done.   
  1. The Law Does Not Require Self-Sacrifice
No rule in the Geneva Conventions requires a military to accept greater risk to its own forces in order to protect civilians on the enemy side.  Military manuals from many countries state this explicitly.  For example, legal guidance used by several NATO militaries notes that: 
  • commanders must consider civilian harm 
  • but they are not obligated to expose their soldiers to excessive danger. 
This reflects the idea that a government has a primary responsibility to protect its own forces and citizens.   
  1. Practical Example
Imagine two options to neutralize a military target:  Option A: Airstrike using precision weapons 
  • lower risk to soldiers 
  • possible collateral damage. 
Option B: Send ground troops into the building 
  • lower risk to civilians 
  • much higher risk to soldiers. 
International law does not require choosing Option B if it would create significantly greater danger for the attacking forces.  Commanders must consider civilian harm, but they may still choose the option that protects their troops.   
  1. The Role of Proportionality
Even when protecting soldiers, the proportionality rule still applies.  A commander cannot conduct an attack if the expected civilian harm would be excessive compared to the military advantage.  So the law balances three factors: 
  • military necessity 
  • civilian protection 
  • risk to attacking forces. 
 
  1. Why This Issue Is Often Misunderstood
Many people assume that international law requires militaries to prioritize enemy civilians over their own soldiers.  But the law was designed to regulate warfare between states while recognizing that: 
  • soldiers are legitimate combatants 
  • governments must protect their own forces. 
Therefore the law focuses on limiting unnecessary civilian harm, not eliminating all risk.   
  1. Why This Debate Is Intense in Urban Warfare
This issue becomes particularly controversial when combat occurs in densely populated areas, where: 
  • militants operate among civilians 
  • civilian casualties are difficult to avoid. 
Critics may argue that more risk should be accepted by attacking forces. Military lawyers often respond that the law does not require endangering soldiers beyond reasonable limits.   
  1. Israeli Supreme Court View
The Israeli Supreme Court has addressed this issue in several rulings.  In Beit Sourik (2004) and Targeted Killings (2006) the Court emphasized that commanders must balance: 
  • military necessity 
  • proportionality 
  • civilian protection. 
But the Court did not say soldiers must endanger themselves to avoid civilian harm.    Summary  Under international humanitarian law: 
  • militaries must take feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm 
  • attacks causing excessive civilian damage are prohibited 
  • but the law does not require sacrificing soldiers’ lives to protect enemy civilians. 
This balance reflects the law’s attempt to regulate warfare while recognizing the realities of combat.    If you want, I can also explain another important issue that connects to many of your earlier questions:  How international law defines when a civilian loses protection and becomes a lawful target.  yes  This is one of the central and most misunderstood rules in the law of armed conflict (LOAC)when a civilian loses protection and becomes a lawful target.  Under international humanitarian law, civilians are generally protected from attack. However, that protection is not absolute. A civilian can temporarily lose protection if they directly participate in hostilities.   
  1. The Basic Rule: Civilians Are Protected
The law of armed conflict requires distinction between: 
  • combatants (lawful targets at any time) 
  • civilians (protected from attack) 
This rule comes from the Geneva Conventions and customary international law.  Civilians cannot be targeted simply because they belong to the population of the enemy state or territory.   
  1. When Civilians Lose Protection
A civilian loses protection while they are directly participating in hostilities.  The key phrase is Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH).  Examples generally considered direct participation include: 
  • firing weapons at enemy forces 
  • launching rockets or missiles 
  • planting bombs or IEDs 
  • operating military drones 
  • directing attacks or providing tactical intelligence during combat. 
While performing these activities, the person becomes a lawful target.   
  1. The Loss of Protection Is Temporary
Unlike soldiers, civilians do not remain lawful targets permanently.  A civilian is targetable only:  for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.  For example: 
  • A civilian launching rockets can be targeted while doing so. 
  • Once they stop and return to ordinary civilian life, they regain protection. 
This rule appears in Additional Protocol I (Article 51) and is widely accepted as customary international law.   
  1. Continuous Combat Function
Some members of armed groups have a continuous combat role, even if they are not currently shooting.  Examples include: 
  • members of militant organizations who regularly carry out attacks 
  • fighters assigned to operational military roles 
  • commanders directing combat operations. 
These individuals may be treated similarly to combatants because their role is continuous participation in hostilities.  This concept is often called “continuous combat function.”   
  1. Activities That Do NOT Remove Civilian Protection
Certain actions do not normally count as direct participation in hostilities.  Examples include: 
  • expressing political support for a militant group 
  • working in civil government institutions 
  • providing general economic support 
  • participating in protests. 
These individuals remain protected civilians, even if they support one side politically.   
  1. The “Human Shield” Problem
Sometimes civilians are present near military targets.  International law distinguishes between: 
  • voluntary participation in hostilities 
  • civilians forced to remain near military assets. 
Using civilians to shield military targets is illegal under international humanitarian law.  However, the presence of civilians does not automatically make the military target immune from attack.   
  1. Why This Rule Is Difficult to Apply
Determining whether someone is directly participating in hostilities can be difficult because: 
  • militants may operate without uniforms 
  • civilians may temporarily participate in attacks 
  • intelligence may be incomplete. 
Commanders must make decisions based on available information at the time.    Summary  Under international humanitarian law: 
  • civilians are protected from attack 
  • they lose protection while directly participating in hostilities 
  • members of armed groups with continuous combat roles may be lawful targets 
  • once civilians stop participating in hostilities, they regain protection. 
These rules are part of the broader effort to protect civilians while allowing combat operations against enemy forces.    If you want, I can also explain something that connects directly to the Gaza conflict and many public debates:  Why international law treats fighters without uniforms differently from regular soldiers.  yes  This issue is very important in modern conflicts like those involving Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS, or other non-state armed groups. International humanitarian law treats fighters without uniforms differently from regular soldiers, and this difference has legal consequences.   
  1. How the Law Treats Regular Soldiers
Under the Geneva Conventions, members of a state’s armed forces are considered lawful combatants.  They must generally: 
  • belong to an organized armed force 
  • operate under a command structure 
  • carry arms openly 
  • distinguish themselves from civilians (usually by uniforms or visible insignia). 
When captured, lawful combatants receive prisoner-of-war (POW) status.  They cannot be prosecuted simply for participating in combat.   
  1. Fighters Without Uniforms
Members of non-state armed groups often fight without uniforms or visible insignia and may operate within civilian populations.  Under international humanitarian law, such fighters are typically classified as: 
  • unlawful combatants or 
  • unprivileged belligerents. 
This means: 
  • they can still be lawfully targeted during hostilities 
  • but they do not receive the same POW protections if captured. 
They can be prosecuted for taking part in hostilities.   
  1. Why the Uniform Requirement Exists
The requirement to distinguish fighters from civilians serves an important purpose:  It helps protect civilians by ensuring that military forces can identify legitimate targets.  If fighters blend into civilian populations, it becomes harder to apply the rule of distinction.  This is why international humanitarian law requires combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians during military operations.   
  1. What Happens When Fighters Hide Among Civilians
When armed fighters operate inside civilian areas: 
  • they remain lawful targets because of their combat role 
  • but attacks must still follow proportionality and precaution rules. 
The presence of civilians does not automatically prevent attacks on legitimate military targets.  However, the attacking force must still assess civilian risk.   
  1. Continuous Combat Function
Many legal experts use the concept of continuous combat function to classify members of organized armed groups.  Individuals who: 
  • regularly plan or carry out attacks 
  • serve as operational fighters 
  • command combat operations 
may be considered targetable at any time, similar to regular soldiers.  This concept was discussed in several international legal studies and military manuals.   
  1. Loss of Civilian Protection
A person who is normally a civilian can also lose protection temporarily if they directly participate in hostilities.  Examples include: 
  • firing weapons 
  • launching rockets 
  • planting explosives 
  • directing attacks. 
While performing those activities, they may be lawfully targeted.  Once they stop participating, they regain civilian protection.   
  1. Legal Consequences if Captured
If a fighter without uniform is captured: 
  • they may be detained as an unlawful combatant 
  • they may be prosecuted for participation in hostilities 
  • they do not receive automatic POW immunity. 
However, they still retain basic protections under international humanitarian law and human rights law.   
  1. Why This Issue Is Controversial
Conflicts involving non-state groups blur the line between civilian and combatant.  Critics argue that: 
  • the classification of fighters can be unclear 
  • intelligence errors may occur. 
Military lawyers argue that the law must still allow forces to defend themselves against armed groups that operate without uniforms.    Summary  International humanitarian law distinguishes between: 
  • lawful combatants (uniformed soldiers with POW protections) 
  • unlawful or unprivileged fighters (members of armed groups without uniforms). 
Fighters without uniforms: 
  • can still be lawfully targeted during hostilities 
  • may be prosecuted if captured 
  • do not receive full prisoner-of-war status. 
These rules are intended to protect civilians by requiring fighters to distinguish themselves from the civilian population.    If you want, I can also explain something that many people find surprising when studying these laws:  Why the Geneva Conventions were originally designed mainly for wars between states and struggle to address modern conflicts with terrorist organizations.  yes  This is an important historical point. The Geneva Conventions were primarily designed for wars between states, and many legal scholars argue that modern conflicts with non-state armed groups (terrorist organizations, insurgent groups, militias) do not fit neatly into the legal framework that was created in the mid-20th century.  Understanding this helps explain many of the legal debates you hear today.   
  1. The Geneva Conventions Were Written After World War II
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 were adopted after World War II to regulate warfare between nation-states with regular armies.  They assumed a typical structure of war: 
  • two states fighting each other 
  • uniformed armies 
  • identifiable battlefields 
  • clear front lines 
  • combatants separated from civilians. 
Under this model: 
  • soldiers wear uniforms 
  • civilians stay outside combat 
  • captured soldiers become prisoners of war (POWs). 
This system worked relatively well for traditional interstate wars.   
  1. Modern Conflicts Often Do Not Follow That Model
Many conflicts today involve non-state armed groups, such as: 
  • terrorist organizations 
  • insurgent movements 
  • militias. 
These groups often: 
  • do not wear uniforms 
  • operate within civilian populations 
  • fight from residential areas 
  • blend into civilian society when not fighting. 
This makes it much harder to apply rules designed for uniformed armies fighting each other.   
  1. Additional Protocols Tried to Address This Problem
In 1977, two Additional Protocols were adopted to expand the Geneva Conventions.  They attempted to regulate: 
  • wars of national liberation 
  • conflicts involving irregular forces 
  • guerrilla warfare. 
However, not all countries accepted these changes fully, and interpretations still vary.   
  1. The Legal Category of “Non-International Armed Conflict”
International law now distinguishes between two types of conflict:  International armed conflict  War between states.  Non-international armed conflict  Conflict between a state and a non-state armed group.  Most modern counter-terrorism conflicts fall into this second category.  But the legal rules for this type of conflict are less detailed and less developed than those for traditional interstate wars.   
  1. Problems Created by This Legal Gap
Several issues arise because the Geneva system was not designed for terrorist warfare.  For example:  Combatant status  Members of armed groups may not qualify as lawful combatants.  Prisoner-of-war protections  Captured fighters may not receive POW status.  Civilian protection  When fighters operate among civilians, distinguishing between the two becomes difficult.   
  1. Urban Warfare
Modern conflicts often take place in cities, where: 
  • civilians live 
  • infrastructure is dense 
  • fighters operate inside civilian buildings. 
The Geneva Conventions were written when many wars occurred in more traditional battlefields, not heavily populated urban environments.   
  1. Asymmetry Between States and Armed Groups
States are legally bound by international humanitarian law.  Non-state armed groups may: 
  • ignore these rules 
  • deliberately violate them 
  • target civilians intentionally. 
This creates an asymmetric legal environment, where one side follows legal restrictions and the other may not.   
  1. Why This Debate Continues
Legal scholars continue debating how the law of war should evolve.  Some argue the existing framework is still sufficient if applied properly.  Others believe new rules are needed to address: 
  • terrorism 
  • urban warfare 
  • cyber warfare 
  • hybrid conflicts. 
  Summary  The Geneva Conventions were originally designed for wars between states with uniformed armies. Modern conflicts with non-state armed groups create challenges because: 
  • fighters may not wear uniforms 
  • they may operate among civilians 
  • the legal framework for such conflicts is less detailed. 
As a result, applying international humanitarian law in modern conflicts often involves complex interpretation and debate.    If you want, I can also explain something directly related to many public discussions about Gaza and similar conflicts:  Why international law does not prohibit bombing cities even though civilians live there.  yes  International humanitarian law (IHL) does not prohibit bombing cities outright, but it places strict rules on how attacks in cities must be conducted. The law recognizes that wars may occur in populated areas, but it requires militaries to follow specific principles designed to protect civilians as much as possible.  The key principles are distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.   
  1. Cities Are Not Automatically Protected
Under IHL, a city itself is not a military target, but individual military objectives within the city can be attacked.  A military objective is defined as an object that: 
  • makes an effective contribution to military action, and 
  • whose destruction offers a definite military advantage. 
Examples in a city might include: 
  • military headquarters 
  • weapons storage sites 
  • rocket launch positions 
  • command centers 
  • military tunnels or bases. 
These targets may be attacked even if they are located inside urban areas.   
  1. The Rule of Distinction
The rule of distinction requires combatants to distinguish between: 
  • military targets, which may be attacked 
  • civilians and civilian objects, which may not be intentionally attacked. 
Attacks that deliberately target civilians are prohibited.  However, if a legitimate military target is located in a city, an attack may still be lawful if it respects the other rules of the law of armed conflict.   
  1. The Proportionality Rule
Even when attacking a military target in a city, commanders must apply the proportionality rule.  This means an attack must not be carried out if the expected civilian harm would be excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage.  The assessment must be made based on the information available at the time of the decision.   
  1. Precautions in Attack
International law requires attackers to take feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm.  Examples include: 
  • choosing weapons that reduce collateral damage 
  • timing the attack to avoid civilians when possible 
  • verifying the target carefully 
  • issuing warnings if feasible. 
These precautions are intended to reduce civilian casualties while still allowing military operations.   
  1. Why Urban Warfare Is So Difficult
Cities present major challenges for these rules because: 
  • civilians live close to potential military targets 
  • infrastructure is dense and interconnected 
  • fighters may operate within residential areas 
  • military assets may be hidden in civilian buildings or underground. 
These conditions make it difficult to completely avoid civilian harm even when targeting legitimate military objectives.   
  1. Indiscriminate Attacks Are Prohibited
While cities can contain lawful military targets, indiscriminate attacks are illegal.  An attack is considered indiscriminate if it: 
  • cannot distinguish between military and civilian targets, or 
  • uses methods or weapons that strike military targets and civilians without distinction. 
For example, deliberately bombing an entire city without targeting specific military objectives would violate international law.    Summary  International humanitarian law does not forbid bombing cities, but it strictly regulates attacks in urban areas through several principles: 
  • distinction between military targets and civilians 
  • proportionality to avoid excessive civilian harm 
  • precautions in attack to minimize civilian casualties 
  • prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. 
These rules aim to allow military operations while reducing harm to civilians in modern warfare.    If you want, I can also explain a very relevant issue that often comes up in discussions about Gaza and other conflicts:  How international law evaluates whether a warning to civilians before an attack is legally sufficient.  yes  Warnings to civilians before an attack are an important part of international humanitarian law (IHL). They fall under the rule of “precautions in attack.” However, the law does not require warnings in every situation, and it does not define a single method that always satisfies the requirement. Instead, it uses a standard of “effective advance warning when feasible.”  Here is how the rule works.   
  1. The Legal Rule on Warnings
The rule comes from Article 57 of Additional Protocol I (1977) and customary international law.  It states that attackers must:  “give effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.”  This means two key things: 
  1. Warnings must be effective (meaning civilians have a real chance to leave or seek safety). 
  1. Warnings are required only when feasible. 
 
  1. What Counts as an “Effective” Warning
A warning is considered effective if it gives civilians enough information and time to reduce their risk.  Examples that have been used in various conflicts include: 
  • phone calls or text messages 
  • radio announcements 
  • leaflet drops 
  • public broadcasts 
  • sirens or loudspeaker warnings 
  • other communication methods. 
The goal is to alert civilians so they can evacuate or move away from the target area.   
  1. Why Warnings Are Not Always Required
The law recognizes that giving a warning may sometimes be impossible or dangerous.  Examples include: 
  • surprise attacks against enemy fighters 
  • situations where warning would allow the target to escape 
  • immediate threats where there is no time to warn civilians. 
In these cases, the law allows attacks without prior warning.   
  1. Limitations of Warnings
Even when warnings are issued, they do not automatically make an attack lawful.  Commanders must still apply: 
  • distinction 
  • proportionality 
  • precautions in attack 
For example, if a building contains many civilians who cannot leave, issuing a warning alone would not justify an attack if the expected civilian harm would still be excessive.   
  1. Practical Challenges
Warnings can be complicated in real conflicts because: 
  • civilians may not receive the message 
  • they may not have time or ability to evacuate 
  • roads or exits may be blocked 
  • some people may remain voluntarily or under coercion. 
These factors can affect how effective a warning actually is.   
  1. Legal Assessment After an Attack
When courts or investigators evaluate a strike involving warnings, they usually ask: 
  • Was a warning feasible under the circumstances? 
  • Was the warning likely to reach civilians? 
  • Did civilians have a reasonable opportunity to leave? 
The assessment focuses on what commanders reasonably knew at the time, not perfect hindsight.    Summary  Under international humanitarian law: 
  • attackers must give effective advance warning when feasible 
  • warnings must provide civilians a real chance to reduce risk 
  • warnings are not required when circumstances do not permit 
  • even with warnings, attacks must still satisfy proportionality and distinction. 
These rules are part of the broader effort to reduce civilian harm during armed conflict.    If you want, I can also explain a closely related issue that often causes confusion:  Why civilian casualty numbers alone do not determine whether an attack was lawful under international humanitarian law.  yes  This is one of the most common misunderstandings about the law of armed conflict. Many people assume that if an attack causes a large number of civilian deaths, it must automatically be illegal. In international humanitarian law (IHL), however, civilian casualty numbers alone do not determine legality.  The law focuses on the decision made before the attack, not only the outcome afterward.   
  1. The Legal Test Is Not Based on the Final Casualty Count
Under IHL, the key rule is the proportionality test.  An attack is prohibited if the expected civilian harm would be excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage.  This means commanders must evaluate: 
  • the military value of the target 
  • the expected civilian presence 
  • the likely collateral damage. 
The decision is judged based on what was reasonably foreseeable at the time, not solely on what later happened.   
  1. Outcome vs. Expectation
Two situations illustrate the difference.  Situation A: Unexpected Civilian Casualties  A military strike targets a legitimate command center. Intelligence indicates few civilians are present.  After the attack, it turns out that many civilians were inside the building unexpectedly.  Even if many civilians were killed, the strike may still be lawful if the original assessment was reasonable.    Situation B: Foreseeable Civilian Harm  A commander knows a building contains many civilians and that destroying it will likely kill them.  If the military advantage is small and the civilian harm clearly excessive, the attack would likely be illegal, even if the final casualty number is lower than expected.   
  1. Why the Law Uses This Approach
War involves uncertainty: 
  • intelligence may be incomplete 
  • civilians move unpredictably 
  • weapons may not behave exactly as expected. 
Because of this, the law evaluates whether the commander acted as a “reasonable commander” would under the circumstances.   
  1. Civilian Casualties Can Still Trigger Investigations
Although casualty numbers alone do not determine legality, very high civilian casualties often lead to investigations.  Investigators may ask: 
  • Was the target truly a military objective? 
  • Were precautions taken? 
  • Was the proportionality assessment reasonable? 
  • Were warnings given if feasible? 
If the answers suggest serious errors or disregard for civilian life, the attack could still be considered unlawful.   
  1. Why This Rule Is Controversial
Critics argue that this approach can make it difficult to hold militaries accountable when civilian casualties occur.  Supporters argue that judging legality purely by casualty numbers would be unrealistic, because: 
  • legitimate targets sometimes exist in civilian areas 
  • outcomes cannot always be predicted perfectly. 
The law therefore focuses on decision-making before the attack, not only on the final results.    Summary  Civilian casualty numbers alone do not determine whether an attack was legal under international humanitarian law. Instead, legality depends on: 
  • whether the target was a legitimate military objective 
  • whether commanders expected excessive civilian harm compared to the military advantage 
  • whether precautions were taken to reduce civilian harm. 
The key legal question is what a reasonable commander could anticipate before the attack, not just what happened afterward. 
Share: